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LETTING THE "SACRED COW" RUN LOOSE
-THE D.C. CIRCUIT LOOSENS THE
REGULATORY NOOSE AROUND THE F.D.I.C.
IN NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC
PRESERVATION V FEDERAL DEPOSIT
INSURANCE CORPORATION
21 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
I. INTRODUCTION
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act
of 1989 (FIRREA)' provides a roadmap for the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC).2 It serves as a guide for the FDIC's role
in receiving and liquidating the assets of failed thrift institutions.3 In
receiving and liquidating such assets, however, the FDIC often encoun-
ters statutory obstacles.4 Because the FDIC does not want those
1. 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1994). See infra notes 47-54 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the policy reasons behind FIRREA.
2. See infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the FDIC's
purpose.
3. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1823.
4. See National Trust for Historic Preservation v. FDIC, 21 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(encountering a statutory obligation requiring a federal agency to take into account the
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statutory requirements to encumber its role as receiver,5 it periodically
violates federally-mandated procedures. 6 Accordingly, the FDIC exposes
itself to litigation attempting to enjoin its liquidation sales.7
When faced with such an injunction, the FDIC has attempted to
shield itself from a suit by claiming that § 1821(j) of FIRREA8 denies
court jurisdiction when the FDIC acts in its conservator or receiver
functions.9 The Third and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals have held
that § 1821(j) permits courts to exercise jurisdiction over the FDIC in its
receivership capacity if a party sues to enjoin the FDIC from violating
some law."e Both circuit courts concluded that § 1821(j) does not
immunize the FDIC from legal challenges where plaintiffs have no
alternate remedy.
Unlike the Third and Fifth Circuits, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit took a different approach in National Trust
for Historic Preservation v. FDIC." The court held that § 18210)
indeed immunizes the FDIC if the FDIC acts in its receiver or conserva-
tor capacity, regardless of whether another remedy is available to the
claimant."
adverse affects of selling historic property under the National Historic Preservation Act),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 683 (1994); Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. FDIC, 992 F.2d 545
(5th Cir. 1993) (facing the National Environmental Policy Act's regulation that the FDIC
provide an environmental impact statement prior to selling a tract of land).
5. See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of the policies behind
the FDIC's receivership function.
6. Benjamin F. Parks, Two 10,000 Pound Gorillas That Don't Always Know Their
Own Strength-But You Shouldn't!, C867 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 791, 801 (1993).
7. See Sierra Club, 992 F.2d at 547 (attempting to enjoin the FDIC from selling an
"[e]nvironmentally sensitive tract of land"); Cummings Properties Management, Inc. v.
FDIC, 786 F. Supp. 144 (D. Mass. 1992) (regarding a property owner attempting to enjoin
the FDIC from removing a fixture from the property).
8. 12 U.S.C. § 18210). See infra text accompanying note 59 for language of
§ 1821G). See also infra notes 58-67 and accompanying text (explaining § 18210)).
9. 12 U.S.C. § 18210). See infra note 59 for an explanation of the FDIC's
conservator and receivership functions.
10. See infra notes 79-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of Third and Fifth
Circuit decisions.
11. 995 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g granted, 5 F.3d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1993), afj'd on
reh'g, 21 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir.), (per curium), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 683 (1994).
12. National Trust, 995 F.2d at 239-40. See infra notes 98-127 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the court's interpretation of § 18210) in National Trust.
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This Note examines the two approaches that courts have taken in the
§ 1821(j) debate: the "restrained immunity" approach of the Third and
Fifth Circuits," and the "complete immunity" approach of the District
of Columbia Circuit. 4 Additionally, it concludes that the complete
immunity view of the District of Columbia Circuit, while the more
reasonable statutory interpretation, nevertheless results in an unfavorable
outcome for injured plaintiffs and thus warrants a statutory modification.
Part II inspects the history behind limited judicial review by examining
Supreme Court rulings, the legislative history of § 1821(j), and cases
representing disagreements among the circuits in their interpretations of
§ 18210). Part III analyzes the respective approaches, finding the
complete immunity approach to be a more plausible reading of the statute
despite its granting of untouchable status to the FDIC, and thus
concludes that an amendment to § 18210) is appropriate. Part IV
proposes amending FIRREA so that courts will apply jurisdiction to
cases in which the FDIC violates federal law and no other remedy is
available.
II. THE HISTORY OF LIMITING JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. Supreme Court Rulings
The United States Supreme Court has issued several rulings finding
a presumption against limiting judicial review. In South Carolina v.
Regan,'5 the State of South Carolina petitioned the Supreme Court,
seeking an injunction against the Secretary of the Treasury of the United
States. "'6 The State argued that the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982 (TEFRA)"7 violated its Tenth Amendment rights, as well
as the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity. 8 South Carolina
claimed that TEFRA section 31 0(b)(1) limited the instances in which
13. See infia notes 79-97 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 98-127 and accompanying text.
15. 465 U.S. 367 (1984).
16. Id. at 370. South Carolina invoked the Court's original jurisdiction. Id. at 370 n. I
(citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1994)).
17. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat.
596 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 103, 103(a), 7421(a) (1994)).
18. Regan, 465 U.S. at 370.
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bond holders' interest income would be tax exempt.'9 Accordingly, the
State argued, the statute would restrict its freedom to issue bonds and
infringe upon its borrowing power which it contended was "essential to
the maintenance of its separate and independent existence.""0 Treasury
Secretary Donald Regan maintained that the Anti-Injunction Act,2
which prohibits suits purporting to restrain the collection of taxes, barred
the action.22
The Supreme Court concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act did not
apply to "aggrieved parties for whom [Congress] has not provided an
altemative remedy."'  Specifically, the Court concluded that without
the Anti-Injunctive Act, the State had no other means available to
19. Id. at 371. The court concluded that IRS code § 103(a) "exempts from a
taxpayer's gross income the interest earned on the obligations of any [s]tate." Id. at 370.
See 26 U.S.C. § 103(a) ("[G]ross income does not include interest on any State or local
bond."). TEFRA section 3 10(b)(1) altered § 103(a) of the IRS code "to restrict the types
of bonds that qualify for the tax exemption granted by that section." Id. at 371. In order
to receive the interest tax exemption, the amendment required that publicly-issued bonds
be issued in "bearer" form, rather than "registered" form. Id. Thus, by broadly defining
registration-required bonds, TEFRA section 310(b)(l) effectively eliminated the interest
tax exemption for many publicly-issued bond holders. Id.
20. Id. at 372. The State, maintaining that its ability to raise revenues by borrowing
funds through bonds would be frustrated by section 3 10(b)(1), argued: "[T]he imposition
of a tax on bearer bonds would require a State to pay its bondholders a higher rate of
interest on such bonds," thereby creating a practical effect of denying a state its "freedom
to issue obligations in the form that it chooses." Id. at 371, 372.
21. 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (providing that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the
assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person,
whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed").
22. Regan, 465 U.S. at 372. The defendant further argued that declaratory relief was
inappropriate because the Declaratory Judgement Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994), which
authorizes courts to issue declaratory judgements, contains an exception for suits
concerning federal taxes. Id. at 370 n.2.
23. Id. at 378. The Secretary of the Treasury argued that under the test of Enochs v.
Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962), the plaintiff may sue under the
Anti-Injunction Act if: (1) the plaintiff established that he was certain to succeed on the
merits; and (2) the collection of the tax would cause irreparable harm. Id. at 374. The
plaintiff in Williams Packing, however, did not meet this narrow exception because the
plaintiff had an alternative remedy available. Williams Packing, 370 U.S. at 6-7. Because
the plaintiff in that case could file a suit for a refund, the Anti-Injunction Act prohibited
the plaintiff from seeking an injunction against the IRS. Id. at 2, 6. In South Carolina,
however, the Supreme Court distinguished Williams Packing because the State did not
have an alternative remedy available to challenge the tax. Regan, 465 U.S. at 372-73.
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challenge the tax. 24 Because the State lacked standing, it was unable
to contest the statute's constitutionality. 25 The Court further inferred
that Congress did not intend the Anti-Injunction Act to require the
plaintiff to urge a third-party to come forward in order to challenge the
statute's legality.26
Similarly, in Traynor v. Turnage,27 the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged a "strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of
administrative action."'  The petitioners in Traynor were honorably
discharged veterans who had not yet exhausted their "GI Bill"29
educational benefits when the statutorily-allotted time to do so ex-
pired.30 The petitioners sought an extension of the time period for use
of the benefits, claiming that they had been disabled by alcoholism for
much of that time." The issue presented in Traynor was whether the
federal court had jurisdiction to hear this claim because 38 U.S.C.
§ 211 (a) prohibited "judicial review of 'the decisions of the Administra-
24. Regan, 465 U.S. at 373.
25. Id. at 378-80. If the State issues the bonds, the tax liability for the interest on the
bonds shifts from the State to the bondholders. Id. at 379.
26. Id. at 380-81. The court rejected the Secretary of the Treasury's argument that the
State could persuade one of its bondholders to bring a suit challenging section 31 0(b)'s
legality. Id. Rather, the court concluded Congress intended the Act to apply when the
aggrieved party could not "litigate its claims on its own behalf." Id. at 381 (emphasis
added).
27. 485 U.S. 535 (1988).
28. Id. at 542 (quoting Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S.
667, 670 (1986)). See also Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975) (requiring the
Secretary of Labor to overcome the presumption that Congress did not intend judicial
review); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1970) (determining that judicial review
of administrative actions is the rule unless Congress intended otherwise).
29. See Veterans' Readjustment Benefit Act of 1966, 38 U.S.C. § 1661 (1988).
30. Traynor, 485 U.S. at 538 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 1662(a)(1), requiring veterans to use
their educational assistance benefits within ten years following their discharge or release
from active duty).
Petitioners Traynor and McKelvey brought separate suits in the Second Circuit and the
District of Columbia Circuit, respectively, which the Supreme Court considered together
in order to resolve a circuit split between the courts of appeals. Id. at 539-41.
31. Id. at 538. Section 1662 permitted veterans to extend the ten-year period if they
were "prevented from using their benefits earlier by 'a physical or mental disability which
was not the result of [their] own willful misconduct."' Traynor, 485 U.S. at 538 (quoting
38 U.S.C. § 1662(a)(1)). However, the Veterans' Administration (VA) denied their request
because it considered alcoholism "willful misconduct" under its regulations. Id. (citing 38
C.F.R. § 3.301(c)(2) (1987)).
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tor on any question of law or fact under any law administered by the
Veterans' Administration providing benefits for veterans."' 32
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split on
the issue of judicial review of Veterans' Administration decisions.33 In
holding that § 211 (a) did not bar judicial review, the Court noted that the
VA could rebut the presumption in favor of judicial review if it showed,
by "clear and convincing evidence," that Congress specifically intended
to prevent judicial review.34 The Court further stipulated that the
preclusion of judicial review demanded specific language, legislative
history, or congressional intent that were "fairly discernible in the detail
32. Traynor, 485 U.S. at 539 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1982). Section 211
provides:
mhe decision of the Administrator on any question of law or fact under any law
administered by the Veterans' Administration providing benefits for veterans and
their dependents or survivors shall be final and conclusive and no other official or
any court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such
decision by an action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise.
38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1982), amended and revised by 38 U.S.C. § 211(a)(1) (1988),
repealed by Act of August 6, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-83, § 2(a), 105 Stat. 378.
Traynor sought judicial review of the VA's denial of administrative relief in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Traynor, 485 U.S. at 539.
The district court granted Traynor's claim because the complaint "require[d] [the court]
to examine constitutional and statutory questions and not merely issues of VA policy."
Id. at 539 (citing Traynor v. Walters, 606 F. Supp. 391, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Traynor
argued that the VA violated his due process and equal protection rights when it refused
to extend the delimiting period. Id.
Although the district court rejected Traynor's constitutional claims, it did conclude that
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, defined alcoholism as a handicap and that
therefore the VA had discriminated against the veterans on the basis of their handicap by
not extending the delimiting period. Id.
The Second Circuit reversed the district court holding that "§ 211(a) barred judicial
review of the Rehabilitation Act claim." Id. at 539-40 (citing Traynor v. Waters, 791 F.2d
226, 231 (2d Cir. 1986)). The Second Circuit reasoned that Congress did not intend for
the statute to give handicapped veterans any more right to judicial review than other
veterans. Id. at 540 (citing Walters, 791 F.2d at 229).
In McKelvey's case, by contrast, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit determined that it indeed had jurisdiction to hear the case and concluded that§ 211(a) did not bar the claim. Id. at 540, 541. The District of Columbia Circuit,
however, reversed the case on the merits, and ruled that the VA was reasonable in
concluding that "alcoholism is a 'willfully caused handicap."' Id. at 541 (citing McKelvey
v. Turnage, 792 F.2d 194, 200-01 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
33. Traynor, 485 U.S. at 541.
34. Id. at 542 (quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967)).
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of the legislative scheme."'3S Finding no clear intent on the part of
Congress to preclude judicial review in this instance, the Court granted
jurisdiction and further concluded that doing so would not undermine the
purposes of § 21 1(a).36
In an earlier case, the Supreme Court held that depriving injured
parties of their only available remedy violates the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. 7 In Bob Jones University v. Simon,3" the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) revoked a private University's tax-exempt
status 39 on the grounds that the University refused to admit African-
Americans.4" Fearing a crippling effect upon its fundraising capabili-
35. Id. at 542 (quoting Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S.
667, 673 (1986); Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 351 (1984)).
36. Id. at 543-44. The Court cited the purposes of § 211(a) as insuring that veteran
claims do not burden the courts, and insuring that the VA will adequately and uniformly
apply its complex policies. Id. at 543.
37. See Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974). See also U.S. CONST.
amend. V ("[N]or shall any person ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process ....).
38. 416 U.S. 725 (1974).
39. Id. at 735. The IRS revoked the university's "ruling letter" in 1970, announcing
that "it would no longer allow § 501(cX3) status for private schools maintaining racially
discriminatory admissions policies." Id. In order to obtain tax-exempt status, an
organization must comply with 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994). The provision defines
potential tax-exempt organizations as:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and
operated exclusively for... educational purposes.... no part of the net earnings of
which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial
part of the activities ... [attempt] to influence legislation, ... and ... does not
participate in,... any political campaign ....
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).
In addition to meeting the statutory requirements of § 501, the organization must also
obtain a ruling letter from the IRS, which certifies the organization's compliance with
§ 501(c)(3) and insures a place on the "Cumulative List." Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at
728-29. The Cumulative List, which is published by the IRS, is an official list of tax-
exempt organizations. Id. at 729. Contributions made to an organization on the
Cumulative List may qualify as a deduction on the donor's tax return. Id. A university
stakes its financial livelihood upon its inclusion on the list in light of the fact that "[m]any
contributors simply will not make donations to an organization that does not appear on the
Cumulative List." Id. at 730.
40. Id. at 735. As a fundamentalist Christian university, Bob Jones purportedly based
its policy of denying admission to African-Americans on its "adherence to certain religious
precepts." Id. These beliefs included the belief "that God intended segregation of the
races and that the Scriptures forbid interracial marriage." Id. In order to maintain these
beliefs the university excluded all Negroes. Id.
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ties, the University sought to protect its tax-exempt status by enjoining
the IRS action." The Supreme Court concluded that the Anti-Injunc-
tion Act prohibited injunctive relief without violating the University's
due process rights.42 Contending that the University had alternative
remedies available to it,43 the Court reasoned "[t]his is not a case in
which an aggrieved party has no access at all to judicial review. Were
that true, our conclusion might well be different."44 Thus, by implica-
tion, the Court gave great weight to the existence of alternate remedies
in considering the preclusion of judicial review, even if such alternatives
would be grossly impractical.
The Supreme Court favors judicial review in several situations,
including: (1) when Congress has not expressly prohibited review in a
statute; (2) when review does not interfere with the statute's purpose; and
(3) when plaintiffs have no alternative forms of relief.45 However,
Congress periodically provides federal agencies with immunity.46 In
41. Id. at 735. Rejecting the IRS' argument that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear
the claim, the South Carolina District Court enjoined the IRS. Id. at 736 (declining to
apply the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (1994), which forbids a court from
interfering in the collection of taxes). See also Bob Jones Univ. v. Connally, 341 F. Supp.
277, 284 (D.S.C. 1971) (concluding that the IRS did not revoke the university's tax-
exempt status in order to assess and collect taxes, rather it did so to compel the university
to comply with certain political or social guidelines concerning racial integration).
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit determined that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the lawsuit.
Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 736 (citing Bob Jones Univ. v. Connally, 472 F.2d 903 (4th
Cir.), reh'g denied, 476 F.2d 259 (4th Cir. 1973)).
42. Id. at 746. The Court, following the Williams Packing test, found that petitioner's
constitutional claims were debatable, so as to fail the "certainty of success" prong of the
test. Id. at 737 (citing Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 6-7
(1962)). To avoid the Anti-Injunction Act under the Williams Packing test, a party must
show both irreparable injury and certainty of success on the merits. Id. The Court noted
further that the petitioner could not maintain that "under no circumstances could the
Government ultimately prevail." Id. (quoting Williams Packing, 370 U.S. at 7). See supra
note 23 for a discussion of Williams Packing.
43. Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. 746-47. Although the university may suffer litigation
costs and delay, the other possible remedies include petitioning the Tax Court to review
the assessment of expecting income taxes, or paying the taxes and then filing for a refund
under the IRS' refund procedures. Id. The Court further expounded, that although such
a result puts a tax-exempt organization in "a precarious financial position, the problems
presented do not rise to the level of constitutional infirmities." Id. at 747.
44. Id. at 746.
45. See supra notes 15-44 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 98-127 and accompanying text.
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such instances, the legislative history behind a provision forbidding
judicial review is often replete with unique facts explaining why the
agency needs protection from the courts.
B. Section 18216F): Statutory Background
Throughout most of its existence, the savings and loan (S&L), or
"thrift" industry in the United States committed itself largely to home
mortgage lending.47 Because rising interest rates in the 1970s and early
1980s threatened the entire industry,4" Congress and the Reagan
Administration proposed to expand the S&L's powers and deregulate the
industry.49 The lack of government supervision and ensuing high-risk
investments5" caused the greed-driven and fraud-infested lending system
to spiral out of control." In order to save the industry, Congress and
the Bush Administration passed the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989.5
Congress enacted FIRREA "to restore the strength of the thrift
industry."53  The Act proposed to increase federal supervision and
enforcement power, expedite the liquidation and resolution process of
insolvent thrifts, regulate the insurance deposits, and create a stable rate
of insurance premiums.' To achieve these goals, FIRREA granted the
47. H.R. REP. No. 54(I), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 291 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 87.
48. Id. During the 1970s and early 1980s, the S&L industry issued low-yielding, long-
term, fixed-rate mortgages, which caused it to suffer insurmountable operating losses when
interest rates rose. Id. As a result, the S&Ls received low interest rates on mortgage loans
and paid high interest rates on deposits. Parks, supra note 6, at 793.
49. H.R. REP. No. 54(I), supra note 47, at 291, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 87.
In order to aid the banking industry, the Reagan Administration expanded the S&L's
"permissible thrift investment powers" and provided assistance in helping the industry
compete for funds. Id. See also Parks, supra note 6, at 794 (recognizing the need to take
corrective action in order to save the S&L industry).
50. Parks, supra note 6, at 793 (commenting on the proliferation of investment in risky
junk bonds as a specific cause of the S&L industry's problems).
51. Id.
52. 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1994). See also Parks, supra note 6, at 793-95 (discussing the
history behind FIRREA).
53. H.R. REP. No. 54(I), supra note 47, at 291, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 87.
54. Parks, supra note 6, at 794 (highlighting the powers gained by the FDIC).
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FDIC more power" and created new entities to assist it.56 Congress
intended the FDIC to liquidate and resolve failed institutions in a speedy
and effective manner, and it demonstrated this intent in § 1821(j), which
allows the FDIC "to act quickly in these volatile situations ... and
swiftly to bring stability to the [failed] institution."57
Section 18210) provides the FDIC with the power to expedite
litigation.5" Section 18210) states: "Except as provided in this section,
no court may take any action, except at the request of the Board of
Directors by regulation or order, to restrain or affect the exercise of
powers or functions of the [FDIC] as a conservator or a receiver."59
Conceived to shield the FDIC from court interference when carrying out
its statutory duties, Congress designed § 18210) "to ensure that the FDIC
could 'act in a quick and decisive manner in reorganizing, operating, or
dissolving failed' financial institutions. '
When the FDIC is appointed receiver, it must make crucial decisions
concerning the failed financial institution's assets and liabilities in a short
period of time.6 In order for the FDIC to respond to changing markets,
to collect outstanding loans, and to maintain the value of the institution's
portfolio, the FDIC must act quickly during this arguably unstable
55. The bill abolished the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC)
and delegated its duties to several new entities and to the FDIC. H.R. REP. No. 54(l),
supra note 47, at 291, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 87. See also Parks, supra note
6, at 795 (discussing the grant of power to the FDIC to enabling it to revoke deposit
insurance, and the expansion of its enforcement powers, allowing it to act quickly in cases
of default or mismanagement).
56. H.R. REP. No. 54(I), supra note 47, at 291, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 87.
FIRREA created the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), the Federal Housing Finance
Board (FHFB), and the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). Id. Like the FDIC,
Congress granted the RTC both the power to "resolve" insolvent thrifts, and protection
under § 18210) when acting as a conservator or receiver of a failed institution. See Parks,
supra note 6, at 795.
57. Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. FDIC, 992 F.2d 545, 550 (5th Cir. 1993).
58. 12 U.S.C. § 18210) (1994).
59. Id. "Conservator" and "receivership" finctions refer to the FDIC's role in taking
over and liquidating the assets of failed financial institutions. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
306, 1269 (6th ed. 1990).
60. Sierra Club, 992 F.2d at 550 (quoting 281-300 Joint Venture v. Onion, 938 F.2d
35, 39 (5th Cir. 1991)).
61. Id. In addition, the FDIC must make crucial decisions regarding properties and
accounts which may involve an enormous amount of money. Id.
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period. 2 Thus, it was the urgency the FDIC faces as a receiver which
prompted Congress to protect the FDIC from court actions.63 Giving
the courts jurisdiction over claims against the FDIC and the power to
grant an injunction may inhibit the FDIC from serving as an effective
conservator or receiver and may impede the FDIC from responding in the
first instance."
According to the legislative history behind FIRREA, Congress based
§ 1821(j) on an analogous protective provision contained in
§ 1464(d)(2)(D) of the Home Owners' Loan Act (HOLA).6 ' HOLA
similarly provided that courts could not restrain or affect the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation's (FSLIC) exercise of its
receivership functions." Following this provision, Congress asserted
that § 1821(j) should bar courts from restricting the FDIC in the exercise
of its power as a conservator or receiver.67
The Supreme Court had recently interpreted the scope of HOLA's
§ 1464(d)(6)(C), currently codified as § 1464(d)(2)(D), at the time
Congress incorporated a form of that provision into FIRREA. 68 In Coit
Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC,69 the petitioner sued a savings
and loan institution over disagreements regarding loans it had pro-




65. 12U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2XD) (1994), originally codifiedas 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C)
(1988). See H.R. REP. No. 54(I), supra note 47, at 334, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 130 (explaining that courts shall be similarly barred under FIRREA as they were under
HOLA from "restraining or affecting" the agency's powers as conservator or receiver).
See also Parks, supra note 6, at 801 (noting that § 1821(j) was based on § 1464(d)(6)(C)).
66. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(dX2)(D) (1994). Section 1464(d)(2)(D) provides: "[e]except
as otherwise provided. . . no court may take any action for or toward the removal of any
conservator or receiver... to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of a
conservator or receiver." See supra text accompanying note 59 for the language of
§ 1821).
67. H.R. REP. No. 54(1), supra note 47, at 334, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 130.
68. Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U.S. 561 (1989). The Court
decided Coit three months before Congress passed FIRREA. National Trust's Petition for
Certiorari at 19, National Trust for Historic Preservation v. FDIC, 21 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir.)
(No. 94-317), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 683 (1994).
69. 489 U.S. 561 (1989).
70. Id. at 565. Coit alleged that the S&L violated Texas usury laws. Id.
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and the FSLIC, as appointed receiver, "[s]ubstitut[ed] itself' for the
defendant S&L in Coit's suit.7' The FSLIC maintained that it had
exclusive jurisdiction over claims against an insolvent S&L.72 The
Supreme Court, however, held that the power to adjudicate a creditor's
claim was beyond the scope of the FSLIC's statutory receivership powers
because § 1464(d)(6)(C) simply provided that, "no court may take any
action ... [to] restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of
a ... receiver. 7  The Court distinguished between the claims against
the insolvent institution itself and those directly against the FSLIC in its
receiver capacity.74 Having added that § 1464(d)(6)(C) did not divest
the courts of jurisdiction to hear a creditor's claim against an institution
under FSLIC receivership, the Court concluded that such claims
unresolved by the FSLIC's administrative procedure would have access
to the courts. Thus, the Supreme Court's interpretation of
§ 1464(d)(6)(C), the provision upon which Congress based § 1821(j), 76
71. Id.
72. Id. at 565-66.
The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding
that, "suits by creditors against the FSLIC as receiver must be presented first to the FSLIC,
then appealed to the [Federal Home Loan Bank Board], and only then appealed to the
federal courts under the Administrative Procedure Act." Coit Independence Joint Venture
v. FirstSouth, 829 F.2d 563, 564 (5th Cir. 1987).
The district court and the court of appeals both relied on North Mississippi Savings &
Loan Ass'n v. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054
(1986). Hudspeth concluded that Congress intended § 1464(d)(6)(C) to prevent judicial
and regulatory authorities from interfering with the FSLIC's functions. Id. at 1101.
Hudspeth unsuccessfully argued that a claim against a debtor is not a receivership function
and therefore a court may adjudicate the claim. Id. at 1102.
Following Hudspeth, several courts have dismissed claims on jurisdictional grounds.
See, e.g.. Red Fox Indus. v. FSLIC, 832 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1987) (transferring borrower's
claim from federal court to FSLIC); Resna Assoc., Ltd. v. Financial Equity Mortgage
Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1371 (D.N.J. 1987) (concluding that Congress denied courts
jurisdiction over claims against S&Ls by enacting § 1464(d)(6)(C)).
73. Colt, 489 U.S. at 574 (emphasis omitted) (quoting § 1464(d)(6)(C)).
74. Id. at 574-77. The Supreme Court rejected Hudspeth because it assumed that the
adjudication of a creditor's claim against the FSLIC would restrain or affect the FSLIC in
its exercise of its power to function as a receiver. Id.
75. Id. at 575, 577. See also National Trust's Petition for Certiorari at 19, National
Trust for Historic Preservation v. FDIC, 21 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir.) (No. 94-317), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 683 (1994).
76. Parks, supra note 6, at 801.
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gives the FSLIC and other entities77 broad protection from court
interference when the entity acts as a receiver.78
C. Limited View of§ 18210)
The Fifth and the Third Circuits have interpreted § 1821(j) to
provide the FDIC with only restrained immunity from judicial interfer-
ence.79 In Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. FDIC,8" the Fifth Circuit
held that § 1821(j) did not deny the district court equity jurisdiction to
enjoin the FDIC when it violated the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA).8 The Sierra Club argued that NEPA required the FDIC, as
a federal agency, to consider the environmental impact of its actions -
here, the approval of the sale of a tract of land containing wetlands.8 2
When the FDIC failed to comply with NEPA, the Sierra Club sued to
enjoin the agency's approval of the sale.83 The district court issued a
preliminary injunction, and the FDIC appealed to the Fifth Circuit.8 4
77. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (discussing the abolition of the
FSLIC and the delegation of its powers to the FDIC, RTC and other bodies).
78. Parks, supra note 6, at 801.
79. See infra notes 80-97 and accompanying text.
80. 992 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1993). The FDIC, upon acquiring certain assets of a failed
bank, approved the sale of a tract of environmentally-sensitive wetlands to Heights Bank.
Id. at 547. The acquisition agreement provided that if the FDIC could approve the sale
in advance, it would insure any capital loss the Heights Bank might suffer on resale of the
land. Id. at 547-48. After the FDIC approved the sale of the wetlands to a prospective
buyer, plaintiffs sued to enjoin the sale, alleging the FDIC failed to follow the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Id. at 548. See infra note 81 for discussion of NEPA.
81. Id. at 552. See also National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321
(1988). NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) prior to engaging in certain actions which might adversely affect the environment.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2).
When Congress passed NEPA, it was the "environmental protection counterpart" of the
National Historic Preservation Act of 1966. National Trust's Petition for Certiorari at 10,
National Trust (No. 94-317). Section 47 of the National Historic Preservation Act
provides: "[tihe head of any Federal agency ... shall, prior to the approval of the
expenditure of any Federal funds on [an] undertaking ... take into account the effect of
the undertaking on any ... building ... that is included in ... the National Register."
16 U.S.C. § 470f (1994).
82. Sierra Club, 992 F.2d at 548.
83. Id. The Sierra Club's utmost objective was to prevent the sale of the wetlands to
this particular buyer so that a more environmentally conscious buyer, such as the Texas
Nature Conservancy, might have an opportunity to acquire the property. Id.
84. Id.
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The court of appeals rejected the FDIC's argument that
§ 18210) barred the district court from exercising equity jurisdiction in
these matters.8 5 Rather, the court focused on a series of United States
Supreme Court rulings which ensured equitable jurisdiction to the federal
courts unless Congress, by statute, "clearly and unambiguously" had
limited the courts' equitable powers.8 6 The Fifth Circuit determined
that Congress had not clearly and unambiguously indicated an intent that
§ 18210) should insulate the FDIC from federal courts' equity jurisdic-
tion." The court concluded that because the FDIC was acting in its
corporate capacity when it approved the sale of the wetlands, the
intended policy reasons for protecting it from court action in its
receivership capacity - ensuring the FDIC had the opportunity to act
quickly in dissolving failed thrift institutions-did not exist.88
The Third Circuit, in Rosa v. Resolution Trust Corp.,89 reached a
similar conclusion, holding that § 18210) did not operate to bar federal
court jurisdiction and deprive plaintiffs of a remedy as long as the court's
action did not "restrain or affect" the Resolution Trust Corporation's
(RTC)' exercise of power as conservator or receiver.9 In Rosa, when
85. 1d.
86. Id. (citing inter alia, Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987)
(holding that full scope of equity jurisdiction is to be recognized unless a statute restricts
jurisdiction "in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference.")).
87. Id. at 549-50. The Court noted that because the FDIC was acting in its corporate
capacity when it approved the land sale, it was not within the protected and statutorily-
mandated receiver or conservator capacity. Id. at 550-51. The FDIC argued that
§ 1823(d)(3)(A), pertaining to the FDIC's corporate functions, implied the same immunity
from the court's equity jurisdiction by the language: "the Corporation shall have all the
rights, powers, privileges, and authorities of the Corporation as receiver under sections
1821 and 1825(b) of this title.' Id. at 549. Thus, the FDIC argued that § 1823(d)(3)(A)
provided it with the same protection in its corporate capacity that it enjoyed under
§ 1821j) as a receiver. Id. at 548-49. The court, however, ruled that § 1823(d)(3)(A)'s
broad referral to § 1821 did not constitute a clear and unambiguous mandate to shield the
FDIC from federal equity jurisdiction. Id. at 549-51.
88. Id. at 550 (stating that "Congress enacted section 1821() to ensure that the FDIC
could 'act in a quick and decisive manner in reorganizing, operating, or dissolving failed'
financial institutions") (quoting 218-300 Joint Venture v. Onion, 938 F.2d 35, 39 (5th Cir.
1991)), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1057 (1992).
89. 938 F.2d 383 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 981 (1991).
90. Because FIRREA § 1821's administrative claims procedures apply to both the
RTC and FDIC, cases citing one can be considered precedent for the other as well. See
National Trust's Petition for Certiorari at 11 n.10, National Trust for Historic Preservation
v. FDIC, 21 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir.) (No. 94-317), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 683 (1994). See
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the RTC terminated a retirement benefit plan in violation of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 92 the plan
beneficiaries sought an injunction to restrain the termination.93 The
district court granted a preliminary injunction,94 and the RTC appealed,
arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
those claims against it in its receiver and conservator capacities." The
Third Circuit held that while § 18210) did not protect the RTC from
judicial interference with acts done in its corporate capacity, the section
did protect the RTC in its receiver and conservator roles.96 More
importantly, however, the court explained that § 18210) might not
protect the RTC from injunctive relief, even when acting in its receiver
or conservator capacities, if no other relief is available to a plaintiff.97
Thus, the Fifth and Third Circuits found that § 18210) did not
restrict federal jurisdiction if Congress failed to clearly and unambiguous-
ly limit equitable jurisdiction or if the plaintiff had no alternative remedy
available.
D. The Complete Immunity View
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit sided with those courts that have denied jurisdiction in
also supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing creation of the RTC).
91. Rosa, 938 F.2d at 397-400.
92. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
93. Rosa, 938 F.2d at 389-90.
94. Id. at 390 (citing Rosa v. Resolution Trust Corp., 752 F. Supp. 1231, 1240 (D.N.J.
1990)).
95. Id. at 390, 391.
96. Id. at 399. Although the RTC conceded that it was not immune to judicial
interference when claims directed at it in its corporate capacity were at issue, it
successfully argued that the plaintiffs had not met their burden of proving irreparable harm
as required for the injunction. Id. at 399-401.
97. Rosa, 938 F.2d at 400 (citing South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 378 (1984)
(permitting an injunction to issue under the Anti-Injunction Act if Congress has not
provided the plaintiff with an alternative remedy); Enochs v. Williams Packing &
Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962) (permitting an injunction to issue if the United States
cannot establish its claim).
In Rosa, the court noted that plaintiffs indeed had an alternative remedy. Thus,
allowing § 18210) to bar injunctive relief was appropriate. Id. at 399400.
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cases in which the FDIC acted as a receiver.98 In National Trust for
Historic Preservation v. FDIC,99 the District of Columbia Circuit ruled
that § 1821(j) denied the court jurisdiction and indeed protected the
FDIC from an injunction,"ro despite the FDIC's violation of a federal
statute and the claimant's lack of alternate remedies.'' The FDIC
acquired the Dr. Pepper Headquarters Building"°2 in Dallas while in the
process of liquidating the assets of an insolvent bank and agreed to sell
the building to DalMac Investment Corporation (DalMac). °3 After the
parties signed the contract, the Dallas Landmark Commission notified the
public that the building was eligible for placement on the National
Register of Historic Places. Despite this turn of events, the FDIC
authorized DalMac to obtain a permit for the building's demolition.' 4
Two weeks later the Texas Historical Commission and the federal
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation warned the FDIC that the
demolition or sale of an historic building, absent compliance with certain
sections of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA),' °5 might
98. See, e.g., Telematics Int'l, Inc. v. NEMLC Leasing Corp., 967 F.2d 703, 704-06
(1st Cir. 1992) (holding that § 1821() evidenced Congress' intent that courts not enjoin
the FDIC from foreclosing on a certificate of deposit in which a failed bank in receivership
had a security interest); Automated Business Sys. & Servs., Inc. v. FDIC, No. 90-1513,
1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 23401, at *1-*2 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 1990) (holding that § 18210)
expressly prohibits restraining the liquidation of assets, thus refusing to enjoin FDIC "from
impounding or freezing the cash flows generated ... by the FDIC").
99. 21 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 683 (1994).
100. Id. at 471.
101. Id. at 472-73 (Wald, J., concurring). Justice Wald expressed concern about the
FDIC violating civil and criminal statutes, but concluded that a party aggrieved by
unlawful conduct could seek administrative relief under § 1821(d) which includes the
possibility of judicial review. Id. at 472.
102. The Dr. Pepper building was considered "one of the finest examples of Art
Moderne architecture in Texas." National Trust for Historic Preservation v. FDIC, 995
F.2d 238, 241 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Wald, J., dissenting).
103. National Trust's Petition for Certiorari at 6 & n.4, National Trust for Historic
Preservation v. FDIC, 21 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir.) (No. 94-317), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 683
(1994). The Dr. Pepper Building was subject to a lien in favor of the First Republic Bank
of Dallas, which failed in 1991. Id.
104. Id. at 6. The FDIC had power of attorney which enabled it to authorize DalMac
to apply to the City of Dallas for a demolition permit so that it could clear the land and
build a strip shopping mall. Id. at 6.
105. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470f, 470h-2 (1994). The NHPA strives to ensure that the nation's
"legacy of cultural, educational, aesthetic, inspirational, economic, and energy benefits will
be maintained and enriched for future generations." 16 U.S.C. § 470(b)(4). To this end,
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lead to litigation."°  Nevertheless, the FDIC refused to stop the
sale." 7
NHPA requires federal agencies "to factor into their decision-making any adverse effect
their 'undertakings' would have on such property." National Trust for Historic
Preservation v. FDIC, No. CIV.A.93-0904-HHG, 1993 WL 328134, at *1 (D.D.C. May
7, 1993).
Section 470f of the N1-PA provides:
The head of any Federal agency having direct or indirect jurisdiction over a
proposed Federal or federally assisted undertaking in any State and the head of any
Federal department or independent agency having authority to license any
undertaking shall, prior to the approval of the expenditure of any Federal funds on
the undertaking or prior to the issuance of any license, as the case may be, take into
account the effect of the undertaking on any district, site, building, structure, or object
that is included in or eligible for inclusion in the National Register.
16 U.S.C. § 470f.
NHPA 16 U.S.C. § 470h-2(a) provides:
(1) The heads of all Federal agencies shall assume responsibility for the
preservation of historic properties which are owned or controlled by such agency.
(2) Each Federal agency shall establish ... a preservation program for the
identification, evaluation, and nomination to the National Register of Historic Places,
and protection of historic properties. Such program shall ensure-
(A) that historic properties under the jurisdiction or control of the agency,
are identified, evaluated, and nominated to the National Register;
(B) that such properties ... as are listed in or may be eligible for the
National Register are managed and maintained in a way that considers the
preservation of their historic, archeological, architectural, and cultural values in
compliance with section 470f of this title... ;
(C) that the preservation of properties not under the jurisdiction or control
of the agency, but subject to be potentially affected by agency actions are given
full consideration in planning ....
16 U.S.C. § 470h-2(a).
Furthermore, the NHPA requires that a federal agency provide the Advisory Council on
Historic Preservation with the "opportunity to comment with regard to [any] undertaking."
16 U.S.C. § 470f.
The Advisory Council on Historic Preservation defines undertaking as:
any project, activity, or program that can result in changes in the character or use of
historic properties, if any such historic properties are located in the area of potential
effects. The project, activity, or program must be under the direct or indirect
jurisdiction of a Federal agency or licensed or assisted by a Federal agency.
Undertakings include new and continuing projects, activities, or programs and any
of their elements not previously considered under section 106.
36 C.F.R. § 800.2(o) (1994).
106. National Trust's Petition for Certiorari at 6-7, National Trust (No. 94-317).
107. Id. at 7.
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In May 1993, the National Trust for Historic Preservation in the
United States (National Trust)08 sued FDIC in the Federal District
Court for the District of Columbia to enjoin it from selling the Dr.
Pepper building and authorizing the building's destruction without
considering its obligations under the NHPA.'" The FDIC contended
that it was not a federal agency when it acted in its liquidator-corporate
capacity."' Moreover, the FDIC asserted that § 1821(j) prevented the
court from restraining its exercise of its powers and functions as a
conservator."' The district court granted National Trust a temporary
restraining order to prevent the FDIC from selling or demolishing the
building."2 A week later, however, a different district court judge
denied the plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction."' The court
held that, although National Trust was likely to succeed on the merits of
its claim regarding the FDIC's NHPA violation, § 1821(j) prevented the
court from exercising jurisdiction and enjoining the sale."'
National Trust appealed this ruling to the District of Columbia
Circuit."5 The D.C. Circuit denied National Trust's motion for a stay
pending appeal and affirmed the district court's holding that § 18210)
barred court jurisdiction when the FDIC acted in its conservator or
receiver capacity." 6  Moreover, the circuit court rejected National
Trust's argument that § 18210) only applied to claims brought under the
108. Additional plaintiff parties included the Historic Preservation League, Inc., and
Preservation Texas, Inc. Id. at iv.
109. National Trust, No. CIV.A.93-0904-HHG, 1993 WL 328134, at *1. All parties
agreed that once title to the Dr. Pepper building passed to the private buyer, the buyer
would have no duty to comply with the NHPA, and thus National Trust would have no
recourse to prevent the building's destruction. National Trust for Historic Preservation v.
FDIC, 995 F.2d 238, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
110. National Trust, No. CIV.A.93-0904-HHG, 1993 WL 328134, at *2.
111. Id. Defendant FDIC additionally argued that § 1821(d) prohibited courts from
maintaining jurisdiction over "any claim 'relating to any act or omission' of the FDIC in
its capacity as a receiver." Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D)(ii) (1994)).
112. Id. at*1.
113. National Trust for Historic Preservation v. FDIC, No. CIV.A.93-0904-HHG, 1993
WL 211773, at *1 (D.D.C. May 14, 1993).
114. Id.
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administrative claims procedure of § 1821(d),'" 7 noting that there was
nothing in the text of section 18210) to suggest that it was limited to
claims brought by creditors."' Shortly thereafter, National Trust
petitioned for and received a rehearing." 9 On rehearing, the D.C.
Circuit affirmed its original opinion that § 18210) barred jurisdic-
tion. '2 The court rejected the Fifth Circuit's holding in Sierra Club,
which reasoned that § 1823(d) did not clearly and unambiguously
immunize the FDIC from the court's equity jurisdiction. 2'
The court determined that the FDIC had acquired the building in its
corporate capacity under § 1823, and that such actions were protected
from court interference by § 1823(d)(3)(A). 22  When the FDIC
acquires property under § 1823, § 1823(d)(3)(A) grants the Corporation
"all of the rights, powers, privileges, and authorities" contained in
§ 1821.12 Thus, the court concluded that § 1821(j) protects the FDIC
when it acts in its corporate role pursuant to § 1823, even though
§ 1821(j) only applies to the FDIC in its conservator or receiver
capacities."'
117. Section 1821(d) sets forth an administrative claims procedure for creditors to
pursue monetary damages. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3)-(13) (1994).
118. National Trust, 995 F.2d at 239. Although the Supreme Court, in South Carolina
v. Regan, found that the language of the Tax Anti-Injunction Act indicated that Congress
intended courts to have jurisdiction in cases where aggrieved parties had no alternative
remedy, the District of Columbia Circuit Court ruled that the unique context in that case
did not apply to the FDIC. Id at 239 n.l.
The circuit court further reasoned that the "strong language of § 1821(j)" made it
counterintuitive to require FDIC's powers to comply with federal laws, in the absence of
a provision by Congress limiting the effect of an immunizing statute. Id. at 240 (citing
e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a)(2) (1994) (providing that management rights are immunized from
arbitral review under Federal Labor Relations Act only when exercised "in accordance
with applicable laws")).
119. National Trust for Historic Preservation v. FDIC, 5 F.3d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(granting rehearing). The court granted a rehearing because of the Fifth Circuit's recent
decision in Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. FDIC, 992 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1993), which
held that § 1821() did not protect the FDIC from an injunction. National Trust for
Historic Preservation v. FDIC, 21 F.3d 469, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
120. National Trust, 21 F.3d at 471 (reinstating the opinion stated in 995 F.2d 238
(D.C. Cir. 1993)).
121. National Trust, 21 F.3d at 470 (citing Sierra Club, 992 F.2d at 550.
122. National Trust, 21 F.3d at 470.
123. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(d)(3XA) (1994).
124. National Trust, 21 F.3d at 470, 471.
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In rejecting the Fifth Circuit's approach, the D.C. Circuit declared
it unimportant that § 1823(d)(3)(A) "does not speak directly to the
equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts."' 25  The court further
asserted that the Fifth Circuit's decision in Sierra Club, which held that
the FDIC does not enjoy protection in its corporate capacity, would
simply lead the agency to choose to act in its immunized receiver
capacity instead. 26  The National Trust subsequently petitioned the
Supreme Court, which denied its writ of certiorari. 27
III. ANALYSIS
In its petition to the Supreme Court for certiorari, National Trust
contended that the D.C. Circuit created a circuit split by applying
§ 18210) "to bar jurisdiction to enjoin the FDIC's actions in a context
where the court recognized that the plaintiffs had no alternative
remedy."'28 Petitioners asserted that the court in National Trust had
established an "irreconcilable conflict" with decisions from other circuits,
and had "significantly depart[ed]" from the rulings of the United States
Supreme Court.'29 Specifically, National Trust argued that the FDIC
was acting in its corporate capacity when it acquired and sold the Dr.
Pepper Building, and therefore the FDIC was not protected by
§ 1821(j). 30
This section analyzes the distinguishing factors in the D.C. Circuit's
decision in National Trust, with the decision by the Fifth Circuit in
Sierra Club. National Trust argued that one could not distinguish its
case against the FDIC from the Fifth Circuit's holding in Sierra
125. Id. at 470-71 (finding that § 1823(d)(3)(A)'s reference to the protections of
§ 1821 necessarily encompassed § 1821(j)).
126. Id. at 471. Because the FDIC may elect to act in both corporate and receiver
capacities simultaneously, it has every incentive to act in its receiver capacity if it will be
insulated from judicial restraint. Id. Such an outcome may jeopardize the FDIC's ultimate
function, which is "to maximize the value of the failed institution's assets." Id.
127. National Trust for Historic Preservation v. FDIC, 115 S. Ct. 683 (1994).
128. National Trust's Petition for Certiorari at 10, National Trust for Historic
Preservation v. FDIC, 21 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir.) (No. 94-317), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 683
(1994).
129. Id. at 9-10.
130. Id. at 6.
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Club,' because both cases involved the FDIC acting in its corporate
capacity.'32 However, the FDIC's argument for distinguishing Sierra
Club has merit. 3 This section will additionally examine how National
Trust and the FDIC interpret recent Supreme Court rulings concerning
judicial review.
A. Distinguishing Corporate Functions and Receivership Functions
When the FDIC acts in its corporate capacity,'34 the restrained
immunity approach advocates that § 1821(j) should not shield the FDIC
from judicial interference. 5 This proposition appears sound if one
considers the policy reasons for which Congress granted the immuniza-
tion for the FDIC's conservator and receiver roles.'36 Unlike the
urgent need "to act quickly in ... volatile situations" envisioned by
Congress when it promulgated the FDIC's receivership role, 137 the
agency's corporate function seemingly demands "no special need to act
quickly."' 38  Hence, there appears to be "little justification to extend
131. 992 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1993). See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the Sierra Club case.
132. National Trust's Petition for Certiorari at 10, National Trust (No. 94-317). See
infra note 134 (describing the FDIC's corporate functions). See also 12 U.S.C. §§ 1819,
1823 (describing the corporate functions); 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1822 (addressing the
conservator and receiver functions).
133. Respondent FDIC's Brief in Opposition at 9-11, National Trust for Historic
Preservation v. FDIC, 21 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir.) (No. 94-317), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 683
(1994).
134. Generally, the FDIC's corporate function consists of insuring deposits and
monitoring the "soundness" of insured banks. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811, 1814-1821 (1994).
However, the FDIC may also acquire assets in its corporate capacity by purchasing assets
from a threatened institution pursuant to § 1823. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c),(d). See Respondent
FDIC's Brief in Opposition at 2-3, National Trust (No. 94-317).
135. See, e.g., Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. FDIC, 992 F.2d 545, 551 (5th Cir.
1993) (refusing to extend § 1821(j) immunity); Rosa v. Resolution Trust Corp., 938 F.2d
383, 399 (3d Cir. 1991) (refusing to allow § 18210) immunity when FDIC acts in its
corporate capacity). See supra notes 79-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
respective cases. See also Cummings Properties Management, Inc. v. FDIC, 786 F. Supp.
144, 146 (D. Mass. 1992) (declaring that § 1821() does not divest state and federal courts
of subject matter jurisdiction when determining the validity of claims against the agency).
136. See supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
137. Sierra Club, 992 F.2d at 550. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
138. Sierra Club, 992 F.2d at 551.
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the limit on the court's equity jurisdiction."' 39
In Sierra Club, the FDIC became the receiver of a failed institu-
tion. 4 ' Shortly thereafter, it transferred the institution's assets to
another bank and agreed to indemnify the other bank for any losses it
may incur on the subsequent sale of certain assets.'' The FDIC,
however, had to approve the sale prior to indemnification, which required
the FDIC to exercise a corporate function.'42 The Fifth Circuit noted
that § 18210) only applied when the FDIC exercised the powers and
functions of a conservator or receiver.143 The court went on to demon-
strate that the FDIC's decision to approve the sale under § 1823(d)(3)(A)
was made "in the ordinary course of its business" and therefore, the
FDIC was exercising a corporate function.'" Although
§ 1823(d)(3)(A) grants the FDIC the "rights, powers, privileges, and
authorities ... under section [] 1821,"45 the court did extend § 1821(j)
because the FDIC was not exercising a power or function of a receiver
when it approved the sale. 46
Shortly after it decided Sierra Club, the Fifth Circuit decided Ward
v. Resolution Trust Corp.,'47 and held that § 18210) immunized the
Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) when it acted in its receiver
capacity.'48 In Ward, the plaintiff sued to enjoin the RTC from
completing the allegedly illegal sale of a building the agency had
acquired as receiver of a failed thrift.149 The Fifth Circuit found that
if the RTC was exercising an enumerated power, such as the liquidation
of receivership assets, the RTC would be protected under § 18210(),
139. Id.
140. Id. at 547.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 547-48, 549.
143. Id. at 550.
144. Id. at 550-51.
145. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(d)(3)(A).
146. Sierra Club, 992 F.2d at 551.
147. 996 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1993).
148. Id. at 102.
149. Id. at 100. The plaintiff, who wished to acquire the building himself, believed
that the RTC sold the building to a third party for a "viciously low price," and failed to
"adhere to the requirements of 'fair and consistent treatment of offerors."' Id. at 103.
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despite allegations that it was conducting an illegal activity.50 The
Fifth Circuit, noting that Ward was like National Trust, found that "[n]o
court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or
functions of [the RTC] as a conservator or a receiver."''
Although the FDIC argued that the Fifth Circuit created its own
conflict with its decision in Ward,"2 the two cases are distinguishable.
As National Trust argued, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Ward was
consistent with that circuit's decision in Sierra Club.'53 Ward held that
§ 18210) clearly prohibited a court from exercising jurisdiction over the
FDIC when it specifically acted in its receivership capacity-liquidating
assets, whereas Sierra Club acted in its corporate capacity when it
approved the sale of the building.'54
Similarly, in National Trust, the FDIC clearly acted in its receiver-
ship capacity when it sold the assets of a failed bank pursuant to
§ 1823(d)(3)(A).' The D.C. Circuit concluded that the FDIC had
exercised the powers or functions of a receiver and that a subsequent
injunction would "restrain and affect" the FDIC's efforts. 56 Hence, if
the FDIC, while acting as a receiver, acquires assets or liabilities
pursuant to § 1823(d)(3)(A), § 18210) will protect the FDIC from the
150. Id. at 102-03.
151. Id. at 104 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j)). The Fifth Circuit cited National Trust for
the proposition that it would not matter if such a result left plaintiff without an alternative
remedy, noting that allowing jurisdiction due solely to lack of an alternative remedy would
"be tantamount to rendering the provision entirely ineffective." Id. (quoting National Trust
for Historic Preservation v. FDIC, 995 F.2d 238, 239 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
152. Respondent FDIC's Brief in Opposition at 11, National Trust for Historic
Preservation v. FDIC, 21 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir.) (No. 94-317), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 683
(1994).
153. Petitioner National Trust's Reply Memorandum at 5, National Trust (No. 94-317).
154. Id. The Fifth Circuit's Ward ruling is further distinguished from National Trust
by the existence of an alternative remedy for the plaintiff- monetary damages available
through an administrative claims proceeding. Ward v. Resolution Trust Corp., 996 F.2d
99, 104 (5th Cir. 1993). Thus, the existence of another remedy in Ward hampers the
FDIC's argument that the Fifth Circuit's decisions have been inconsistent because Ward
involved simple receivership with an alternative remedy available to its plaintiff, whereas
Sierra Club involved the FDICs corporate functions with no other remedy available for the
plaintiff. Petitioner National Trust's Reply Memorandum at 5, National Trust (No. 94-
317).
155. National Trust for Historic Preservation v. FDIC, 995 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
156. Id. at 241.
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courts.1
57
The D.C. Circuit correctly distinguished between the FDIC's
exercise of a corporate function in Sierra Club, and its exercise of the
receiver function in National Trust. One could infer that it is not merely
the FDIC's formal corporate or receivership capacity that a court should
examine when determining the applicability of § 1821(j), but also the
specific functional role the FDIC played and whether it acted as a
receiver while operating under its § 1823 corporate capacity.
B. Supreme Court Doctrine
The Fifth Circuit's decision is consistent with the Supreme Court's
ruling favoring the right to judicial review absent an alternative
remedy.'58 Specifically, the Court concluded in South Carolina v.
Regan, s9 that the Anti-Injunction Act did not preclude an aggrieved
party from bringing a suit if the party did not have an alternative remedy
available.' 6 The FDIC asserted that Regan merely permits a court "to
look beyond the plain language of a broad anti-injunction statute and to
consider whether extrinsic evidence of legislative intent supports a
narrowing judicial construction.' 16' National Trust, however, relied on
Regan for the proposition that "absen[t] ... an alternative remedy"
Congress did not intend to bar action. 62
The FDIC's conclusion that a court should construe a statute broadly
if there is no evidence in the legislative history to support a narrow
construction, frustrates the spirit of the Supreme Court rulings. 6 As
National Trust suggested, such a conclusion contradicts Regan and other
157. Id. at 240.
158. See South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 378 (1984). National Trust argued
that the Fifth Circuit's holding in Ward was consistent with Sierra Club and Regan
because the court in Ward denied jurisdiction based on the agency's action in its receiver-
ship capacity and the availability of an alternative remedy. See Petitioner National Trust's
Reply Memorandum at 4-5, National Trust (No. 94-317). For a discussion of other
Supreme Court decisions addressing the availability ofjudicial review, see supra notes 27-
36 and accompanying text.
159. 465 U.S. 367 (1984).
160. Id. at 378.
161. Respondent FDIC's Brief in Opposition at 12, National Trust (No. 94-317). See
supra notes 17-29 and accompanying text (discussing Regan).
162. National Trust's Petition for Certiorari at 15, National Trust (No. 94-317).
163. Respondent FDIC's Brief in Opposition at 12, National Trust (No. 94-317).
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Supreme Court rulings which have acknowledged the strong presumption
in favor of judicial review in the absence of clear evidence that Congress
intended otherwise." Indeed, the FDIC and the "[D.C.] Circuit's
analysis turned the Supreme Court precedent on its head" by conversely
making a presumption against judicial review, absent clear evidence that
Congress intended a narrow reading.'65
The Fifth Circuit adopted the opposite approach, and noted that the
right to equity jurisdiction "provides an essential safeguard to individual
rights against arbitrary government action."' The FDIC argued
further that the deprivation of such, when it leaves a party with no
remedy, is "too 'odd' a result to reach" absent a clear showing of
legislative intent. 67  The D.C. Circuit's decision, which sidestepped
this "safeguard to individual rights" failed to address the due process
concerns raised by National Trust. 68  Unlike the injured party in Bob
Jones University v. Simon, 69 the plaintiff in National Trust had no
alternate recourse. 7 Consequently, the preclusion of the court's equity
jurisdiction denied plaintiff its right to assert an action for injury.' 7'
This denial of judicial review raises constitutional due process problems
because it deprived National Trust of its "opportunity to be heard."'
172
The D.C. Circuit reasonably interpreted § 18210) to distinguish
among the FDIC's corporate functions and to recognize that these
164. National Trust's Petition for Certiorari at 13-14, National Trust (No. 94-317)
(citing Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 542 (1988) and Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967)). See supra notes 15-44 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the Supreme Court's presumption in favor of judicial review.
165. Petitioner National Trust's Reply Memorandum at 6, National Trust (No. 94-317).
166. Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. FDIC, 992 F.2d 545, 550 (5th Cir. 1993).
167. National Trust's Petition for Certiorari at 13, National Trust (No. 94-317).
168. See id. at 14 (noting the effect of the court's decision violated the Due Process
Clause).
169. 416 U.S. 725, 746 (1974). The plaintiff university in Bob Jones had options,
although less than ideal, aside from enjoining the IRS. See supra note 43 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the alternative remedies cited by the Court.
170. See National Trust for Historic Preservation v. FDIC, 995 F.2d 238, 239 (D.C.
Cir. 1993). All of the parties agreed that if the FDIC sold the building to a private buyer,
the buyer would not have to comply with the NHPA. Id. See also National Trust's
Petition for Certiorari at 13 n.15, National Trust (No. 94-317).
171. National Trust's Petition for Certiorari at 14, National Trust (No. 94-317).
172. Id.
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functions may at times involve receivership roles which invoke the
protections of § 1821(j). In effect, however, this interpretation denies
plaintiffs a remedy, violates the due process clause, and permits the
FDIC to engage in potentially illegal acts. "Section 1821(j) [should] not
elevate the FDIC to the position of a sacred cow which may graze upon
the rights of others at will, unchecked by the courts."' To combat
this outcome, it would behoove Congress to amend § 1821(j) in order to
prevent abhorrent conduct by the FDIC and to uphold the rights of
injured parties.
IV. WHY § 18210) NEEDS REVISION
The premise that the FDIC may violate federal law and yet remain
immune from judicial action is unsettling, even if it must act quickly in
its receiver capacity. 74 With such freedom given to the FDIC in its
receivership role, the potential exists for it to abuse its discretion in other
contexts aside from the National Historic Preservation Act.'75 Indeed,
even courts have speculated on the potential hazards of "effectively
insulat[ing] the FDIC from judicial intervention even in the face of
allegations of egregious violations of federal law threatening grave and
irreparable harm."'76 Specifically, the statutes which the FDIC could
violate following the D.C. Circuit's approach to § 1821(j) raise concerns
about "potentially immunizing an agency from court enforcement of the
entire U.S. Code.""' While such ponderings appear extreme, they are
173. Cummings Properties Management, Inc., v. FDIC, 786 F. Supp. 144, 146 (D.
Mass. 1992) (citing Harrington v. FDIC, No. 91-122298-C, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20822,
at *6-*7 (D. Mass. Feb. 28, 1992)).
174. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
175. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470f, 470h-2 (1994). See supra note 105 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the NHPA.
176. National Trust for Historic Preservation v. FDIC, 995 F.2d 238, 244 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (Wald, J., dissenting).
177. National Trust for Historic Preservation v. FDIC, 21 F.3d 469, 471 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (Wald, J., concurring). In her concurrence, Judge Wald cited her dissenting opinion
in National Trust, 995 F.2d at 244, in which she speculated that the FDIC, as a receiver,
might "operat[e] a factory or even a hazardous waste facility in a manner that was causing
serious health or environmental damage and that allegedly violated the Clean Water Act
or the Occupational Safety and Health Act [,and] court[s would be] powerless to take 'any
action... to restrain or affect' that operation, unless the FDIC 'has acted or proposes to
act beyond, or contrary to, its statutorily prescribed, constitutionally permitted powers or
functions."' National Trust, 21 F.3d at 471. Wald even hypothesized whether the FDIC
could get away with selling crack cocaine discovered in a safety deposit box of a failed
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just as likely as National Trust's NHPA claim.'78
Thus, a clear and uniform interpretation of § 1821(j) is necessary in
order to ensure the rights of plaintiffs in all circuits. Such an interpreta-
tion appears to be beyond the scope of the courts that follow the
approach espoused by the D.C. Circuit which broadly gives effect to
§ 1821(j). 79 As Judge Wald concluded in her concurrence to National
Trust, only Congress can correct the current "state of affairs" regarding
§ 1821(j).18
A. Proposal
This Note proposes Congress amend § 1821(j) of FIRREA so that
it does not completely bar court actions brought against the FDIC in its
receiver capacity. Under the amended version of § 1821(j), the FDIC
would remain protected from court actions which tended "to restrain or
affect the exercise of powers or functions of the Corporation as a
conservator or a receiver,"'' unless the FDIC violates or threatens to
violate a federal law and the injured party has no alternative remedy.
This amendment would serve two purposes. First, it would prevent
the FDIC from violating the law when it liquidates the assets of failed
banks. Second, it would protect the due process rights of injured
plaintiffs with no alternative recourse by entitling them to the courts'
equity jurisdiction. Such a limitation on a statutory immunizing
provision is not unprecedented. In the past Congress has included such
limits in provisions purporting to shield federal agencies from outside
interference." 2
Congress should limit the amendment to accommodate the policy
reasons for which it enacted § 1821 (j)-the urgent need for the FDIC to
act quickly when liquidating assets as a receiver.'83 Such a proviso
bank. Id. at 472.
178. National Trust's Petition for Certiorari at 13, National Trust (No. 94-317).
179. See National Trust, 21 F.3d at 471 (concluding that the FDIC should be free to
decide how best to operate as a receiver of assets).
180. Id. at 473 (Wald, J., concurring).
181. 12 U.S.C. § 1821U).
182. In the Federal Labor Relations Act, Congress specified that the agency would
enjoy the protection of its decisions if the agency had acted "in accordance with applicable
laws." National Trust, 995 F.2d at 240 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a)(2) (1994)).
183. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
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might require the district court to consider the FDIC's need to act
quickly on a case-by-case basis. Only when the FDIC overcomes a
stringent presumption against immunity and shows the limitation would
upset the purpose of FIRREA, will the court permit it to act in violation
of a law and deny the plaintiff a remedy.
B. Advantages of the Proposal
The primary advantage of the proposal is that it enables the injured
plaintiff to bring an action under the court's equity jurisdiction. Securing
the aggrieved individual's rights in this manner will not impede the
functioning of the FDIC because it will have the opportunity to prove
that its invidious action is so imperative that it warrants a court's
approval.
Furthermore, society as a whole stands to benefit from this proposal
because many of the assets liquidated by the FDIC have historic or
aesthetic value that can be enjoyed by the community. 4 A historic
landmark or a tract of wetlands, for example, fosters an intrinsic value
which society acknowledges by enacting statutes to ensure their
survival.'85 Thus, if the FDIC is permitted to exercise its receiver
functions in disregard of federal laws, its noncompliance could lead to
irreparable harm.
C. Criticism of Proposal
The enactment of this proposal, however, could lead to criticism by
the FDIC that amending § 18210) in this manner would only frustrate
the purpose of FIRREA.' 86  If the FDIC becomes subject to court
jurisdiction in its receiver capacity, the courts can effectively tie its
hands, no doubt causing the FDIC to face unprecedented litigation while
liquidating assets. Accordingly, this escalated litigation would crowd
court dockets and arguably stifle the wheels of justice in the federal
courts. Finally, the inability of the FDIC to "act quickly in... volatile
184. See generally National Trust, 995 F.2d at 241 (Wald, J., dissenting) (pointing out
that the demolition of Dr. Pepper Headquarters Building would be a loss of one of Texas'
"finest examples of Art Modeme architecture").
185. See id. (discussing the placement of a historic building on the National Register);
Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. FDIC, 992 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1993) (involving the
alleged value of a tract of wetlands).
186. 12 U.S.C. § 1811. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text for a discussion
of FIRREA.
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situations" ' 7 would be costly to society if, in the face of another
monumental S&L crisis, the FDIC were unable to efficiently serve as a
receiver or a conservator for failing institutions due to the heightened
likelihood of litigation.
V. CONCLUSION
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act's
(FIRREA) § 1821(j) is presently ambiguous in its applicability to the
FDIC's corporate and receiver or conservator functions. The disparity
between circuits utilizing § 18210) to shield the FDIC from the courts'
equity jurisdiction (1) deprives plaintiffs of the opportunity for redress
if they have no alternative remedy, and (2) allows the FDIC to violate
federal law without accountability in the courts. Congress must amend
FIRREA § 1821(j) so that it protects the due process rights of injured
individuals and puts an end to FDIC immunization as a "sacred cow."
John S. Farmer*
187. Sierra Club, 992 F.2d at 550.
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